Sample essay

Below I have written a sample essay responding to the following essay prompt: *Interpret what Dōgen means in his paradoxical remarks in the first stanza of the Genjō Kōan*. For your reference, here is that stanza:

As all things are buddha-dharma, there is delusion and realization, practice, and birth and death, and there are buddhas and sentient beings.

As the myriad things are without an abiding self, there is no delusion, no realization, no buddha, no sentient being, no birth and death.

The buddha way is, basically, leaping clear of the many and the one; thus there are birth and death, delusion and realization, sentient beings and buddhas.

Yet in attachment blossoms fall, and in aversion weeds spread.¹

To help you understand the mechanics of this essay, I have included two copies of it: I underline all signposting in the first copy and comment extensively in the margin of the second copy.

¹ Dōgen 1985, p. 69.
In this paper, I will argue that Dōgen holds that reality is beyond the reach of conventional human concepts, but that those concepts can nevertheless help us attain enlightenment. To support my interpretation, I will focus on Dōgen’s paradoxical remarks about the central tenets of Buddhism.

Dōgen begins the Genjō Kōan with this startling paradox:

“As all things are buddha-dharma, there is delusion and realization, practice, and birth and death, and there are buddhas and sentient beings.

As the myriad things are without an abiding self, there is no delusion, no realization, no buddha, no sentient being, no birth and death.”

Here Dōgen apparently contradicts himself, saying that delusion, realization, buddhas, etc. simultaneously exist and do not exist. But I will argue that this contradiction is only apparent, for Dōgen qualifies his claims with, respectively, the remark that “all things are buddha-dharma” and the remark that “the myriad things are without an abiding self.” Let me examine those qualifications in order.

I interpret “buddha-dharma” as referring to the teachings of the Buddha. In particular, I suggest, Dōgen has in mind the idea that most beings are deluded and therefore suffer in the cycle of birth, death, and rebirth; we can break this cycle only by following the way of the Buddha (practice) which leads to enlightenment (realization). So if the teachings of the Buddha are true – if all things are buddha-dharma – then there must in fact be deluded and suffering beings who die and are reborn. And so Dōgen affirms the existence of delusion, realization, buddhas, etc.

I further interpret Dōgen’s remark that “…the myriad things are without an abiding self…” as claiming that nothing has a persistent nature. This remark applies to delusion, realization, buddhas, etc.; none of these things have a persistent nature. In other words, delusion, realization, and buddhas are ultimately mere fictions. Hence Dōgen denies the existence of delusion, realization, buddhas, etc.

But if such things do not truly exist, why would the Buddha express his teachings in terms of them? I answer that the Buddha intends for his recommendations to help deluded creatures such as us. So they must initially work around our most central delusion, namely, our belief that we have a persistent nature or abiding self. Yet their ultimate purpose is to remove that delusion.

Thus, on my interpretation of Dōgen, we deluded creatures find it useful to understand reality in terms of the Buddha’s teachings, and in this conventional sense things like delusion, realization, and buddhas exist. But ultimately nothing has a persistent nature, so in the final analysis things like delusion, realization, and buddhas do not exist. We can therefore dissolve the paradox that Dōgen introduces.

Indeed, this interpretation finds further support from Dōgen’s remark that “The buddha way is, basically, leaping clear of the many and the one.” To attempt to divide reality into the many and the one is to attempt to conceptualize reality in terms of the persistent natures of things, and in following the teachings of the Buddha (the buddha way) we eventually learn to leap clear of this temptation.

Dōgen 1985, p. 69.

Ibid.
I conclude that Dōgen sees the Buddhist conceptual framework as a useful but dispensable tool for achieving enlightenment – which requires sweeping away all conceptual frameworks.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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